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THE SUPR.EME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

E . A. CREDIT Ur1 I 0 N ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14561

PAULA PACE,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Respondent, who
was the Plaintiff in the Lower Court, on an Order To Show
Cause why the Court should not order the Appellant, who was
the Defendant in the Lower Court, to deliver to the
Respondent property upon which the Respondent had a lien
upon a secured transaction entered into and signed by both
the Appellant and her spouse which pledged the property as
security.

The Complaint and the Order To Show Cause did

not have joined with it the spouse of the Appellant, but
was an action against the Appellant only.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court did grant to the Respondent the
right to possession of the security pledged by the Appellant,
without having joined in said cause of action the spouse of
thr l\ppellant.
- 1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks an order affirming the
Lo1ver Court's granting to the Respondent a right to immediate
possession of the property which had been pledged to secure
a loan from the Respondent to the Appellant and her spouse,
without the joinder of the Appellant's spouse in the action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent disagrees with the facts as outlined
by the Appellant in the following ways:
1. The Respondent brought an Order To Show

Cause seeking an order requiring Appellant to deliver the
security as listed on the April 1, 1974 note to Respondent.
(R-19)

2. An Order was signed and issued by the Lower
Court on April 1, 1976, directing the Sheriff of Weber
County to take possession of the security and turn it over to
the Respondent to be sold under the terms of the Uniform
Commercial Code.

(R-32)

3. The Court issued the Hrit of Replevin,
a f t e r Re s p o n d en t ' s h ea r i n g o n t h e 0 r d e r To Sh o 1v Ca u s e , bLi t
before trial.

(R-33)
4 . T he Wr i t o f Re p l e v i n

1-1 a s

i s s u e d by t h e

Clerk of the District Court on April 1, 1976; however it was
never delivered to the sheriff for service.

On the 7lst day
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of april,

1976, the Respondent brought a motion to waive

undertaking pursuant to rule 64(F) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; Appellant's counsel David Knowlton appeared.
The Court granted said motion and an Order Waiving the
Undertaking was entered on April 23, 1976.

These documents

were not filed with the Lower Court as Respondent received
an Order from the honorable Bruce S. Jenkins staying further
proceedin~;.

(See Appendix)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

WHEN BOTH SPOUSES HAVE PLEDGED THE SAME PERSONAL
PROPERTY TO SECURE LOANS WITH TWO DIFFERENT
IIJSTITUTIONS, THE HUSBAND'S BANKRUPTCY AND HIS
SUBS~QUENT PURCHASE OF THE PLEDGED COLLATERAL
FROM THE FIRST LIEN HOLDER DOES NOT EXTINGUISH
THE SECOND LIEN HOLDER'S INTEREST.
It is important initially to determine where title
to the security pledged lies.

If title passed to the first

lien holder, the subsequent purchase by the husband of the
Appellant after his Bankruptcy would have vested title solely in
him clear of any liens.

If title did not pass, but remained

in the spouses, the subsequent purchase would only have
extinguished the first lien and title could not have passed
solely to the husband because the first lien holder had never
acquired title.
The transactions by the Paces were secured trans-
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j

.actions which fall under Article 9 of the Uniform Corimercial
Code.

The general policy of Article 9 makes title relatively

u n i mp o r t a n t i n c o n n e c t i o n

vi i

t h a ny s e c u r e d t r a n s a c t i o n .

Ar t i cl e

9 adopts neither a "title theory" nor a "lien theory" and does
not determine title to collateral in either the secured
party or the debtor.

?OA-9-201, Utah Code Annotated, as

amended in 1953, and comments thereto.
However, in some instances it may be necessary
in a secured transaction subject to Article 9 to determine
the location of title in order to apply some rule of law
outside of the Code.

In these instances, it would seem that

the rules under pre-code law might apply.
"In general, under pre-code law, title to pledged
property remained in the pledgor, and only a special
property vested in the pledgee. A pledge did not
confer title to the collateral but only a lien thereon to the extent of the obligation." 68 Am. Jur., 2d,
Secured Transactions,§ 196.
Hence the Appellant and her spouse had title to the property
and never transferred it to either lending institution.

The

Bankruptcy Court could have obtained title to the property;
but by giving a disclaimer to the first lien holder the
Bankruptcy Court never acquired title.

Rather, there was a

revesting of title in the spouses as of the date of the filing
of the petition in Bankruptcy and the Paces continued to hold
title as if Bankruptcy had never occurred.

As a consequence

of the disclaimer, the Bankruptcy Court could not adjudicate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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persons' rights in the property.

This must be done in

state court since the property is not part of the
B~nkruptcy

estate and hence not subject to its jurisdiction.

(Cl;irk v. Huckably, 28 F.2d 154 (C.C.A., 8th Cir., 1928))
The law is clear that a person can transfer only
whatever interest he may have in property.

Therefore, when

the Appellant's spouse purchased the property from the first
lien holder, he was only clearing that lien; there was no
trarsfer of title.

Mr. Pace knew of the second security

agreement with the Respondent and could not claim bona
fide purchaser status with respect to the property.

The

legal effect of the purchase was to extinguish the first
security interest and make the second security interest
held by the Respondent primary; the purchase in no way
affected this security interest.
The Appellant's spouse was discharged in
Bankruptcy of his debt owed to the Respondent.

Likewise,

Appellant, subsequent to the Lower Court's decision, was
similarly discharged in Bankruptcy.

But neither discharge

had an effect on the Respondent's lien.

The term "discharge

in Bankruptcy" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act as the
release of a bankrupt from all his debts which are provable,
except those excepted under the Act.

(11 U.S.C. § 1(15))

What it means to be "released" is found in court decisions.

- 5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the case of Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (1937)
at page 887, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"As a general rule, and except in cases where § 67f
applies, the discharge in Bankruptcy does not effect
an existing lien and only releases the debtor's
personal liability."
In National Finance Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d
9 (1961) the Court further explained:
"A discharge in Bankruptcy is neither a payment nor
an extinguishment of the debt. It is merely a bar to
the enforcement of a discharged debt by legal proceedings."
In the case of Kamas Securities Co. v. Taylor, 119 Utah 2d
241, 226 P.2d 111 (1950) the Court commented on a section of
the Restatement of

the Law of Securities which stated that

a pledge is not terminated by the running of the statute of
limitations against the claim secured by the pledge, nor by
a discharge of the claim in Bankruptcy.

The Court used this

language at page 117 in stating that extinguishing the debt
does not extinguish the security interest:
"Certain statutes vihich in terms seem to extinguish
the debt, have been interpreted as statutes of limitations. Even when interpreted as extinguishing the
debts, the effect is not to terminate a security
interest unless it is especaslly provided that security interests are to eAd with the extinguishment
of the debts."
The Respondent has a security interest in the property.

Its debt was discharged in Bankruptcy, but not its

security interest.

If properly pleaded, the discharge in

Bankruptcy is a complete defense to enforce~ent of the debt,

-6-
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but it nPither destroys the debt nor the moral obligation
to pay.

A debt is divested of its character as a personal

obligation which is legally enforceable, but it remains in
existence so that security given for the debt may be
reso1-~ed

to in qtisfaction of the security agreement.
POINT II

A SECURED PARTY MAY OBTAIN POSSESSION OF
PROPERTY PLEDGED AS SECURITY BY BOTH SPOUSES
BY MEANS OF LEGAL ACTION AGAINST ONE OF THE
SPOUSES.
There is no argument that the common law
estate by the entirety might be recognized in Utah.

There

is an oren question, however, if recognition is extended
beyond estates in real property to personal property.
Tre Appellant refers to two Utah statutes in her brief; but
neither statute plainly extends its coverage to personal
property.

While most American jurisdictions recognize the

estate in real property, there is a split among those
jurisdictions which have ruled on its existence as to
personalty. A majority of these jurisdictions have held
that the estate may exist in personalty; while at least
seven jurisdictions have held that it may not. 64 A.L.R. 2d
8,

4s

6,7.

There is no prior case law in Utah, but if Utah

does follow the majority, there are additional questions,
such as, by what instruments or transactions the estate may
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arise? is there a presumption for household goods and furn·ishings in joint possession of the husband and wife?

Add-

itionally, the Florida court in First National Bank of
Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1971),
made an important distinction regarding the existence in
personal property.

At page 780, the Florida Court noted

that not only must there be the form of ownership consistent
with entirety (as required for real property); but that as
a second standard the intention of the parties to hold the
personal property by the entirety must be proven by the
spouses.

If tenancy by the entirety is recognized in

personal property in Utah, the better view is to require
a showing by the spouses of their intention and the manner
of their obtaining the property, which is not present in the
current action.
Even if the Paces do hold the property subject to
the Respondent's lien by the entirety, the cases cited by
the Appellant do not preclude the Respondent from obtaining
possession of the property by action only against the
Appellant.

The case of Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764

(C.C.A., 4th Cir., 1931) is irrelevant to the issue before
the Court and is distinguishable on its facts.

The facts

of Krakower are similar only to the facts of this case in
that the husband was adjudicated a Bankrupt, but his wife
was not at the time of the action.

The case deals with
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stayir1

t~e

husband's Bankruptcy proceeding

1

while Krakower

sues in the state court against both husband and wife. to
obtain a judgment.

In upholding the lower court's staying

of the Bankruptcy proceeding, the court stated:
"The discharge in Bankruptcy not only prevents
being obtained against him on the note,
but will also prevent, during his lifetime, the
proDerty held by the entireties being subjected
!~ t~e satisfactio~ of_any judgment which maf be
obtained against his wife."
(Emphasis added
j~dgment

The case of Ades v. Catlin, et ux, 132 Md. 66, 103 A. 94
(1918) is similarly irrelevant on its facts.
Both of these cases, and others cited by Appellant,
dealt with a creditor trying to obtain a judgment lien after
Bankruptcy has occurred.

In the present action, the

Respondent is not now seeking to obtain a lien by judgment.
Bef~re

either Bankruptcy, the Paces had voluntarily given

a lien

~ledging

the property as security.

This lien survives

the discharge in Bankruptcy of the debt and the collateral
can be obtained pursuant to the default provisions of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
To allow an assertion that the non-severance
feature of

tenancy by the entireties precludes a secured

party from obtaining jointly pledged property would clearly
be inequitable.

If so permitted, a spouse could pledge

property as security which the secured party could not get
unon default as long as the other spouse is Bankrupt, which

-9-
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would have the effect of eliminating this type of property
from collateral status.

In not permitting such an

assert~on,

this field of credit which would otherwise be closed to the
spouses remains open for the benefit of the spouses and the
secured lendors.
The Appellant contends that the Respondent should
have filed for a disclaimer in Bankruptcy Court during the
Bankruptcy proceeding of the Appellant's spouse and allowed
said court to determine what interest Respondent may have
had in the property; that failure to do so prevents the
Respondent from asserting its right against the property in
the action against the Appellant.

However, the Bankruptcy

Court gave a disclaimer to the first lien holder, in effect
saying that it did not want to be bothered with the property.
It does not make sense to file for a second disclaimer when
the Bankruptcy Court has released the security.
additional good would two disclaimers have done?

What
By disclaiming

any interest in the security the Bankruptcy Court places the
dispute in state court (Clark, supra, page 5) and puts the
parties in the same position regarding rights in the collateral
as if no Bankruptcy petition had been filed.

Hence, the

Bankruptcy Court could not have in fact determined the
Respondent's interest as the Appellant argues.
When a husband and wife execute a note together,

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the obligation to pay is a joint and several liability.
Mr. Pace's prior Bankruptcy would be a complete

defen~e

to suit against him on the debt, but not a defense to the
liability of his wife.

Her signature guaranteed the

availability of the property and, because of the joint
and several liability, she is personally liable for the
debt and she may be suerl and the property taken as against
her.

As in Point I, her subsequent Bankruptcy did not

extinguish the lien.

On the premises of estate by the

entirety, the Appellant argues that the husband should have
been a party to this action.

This probably would have

been more correct procedurely, so that the Appellant
cannot play the "shell game" of ownership; and the simple
process of joining could be done.

However, in substance,

the court can reach the same result with only the
Appellant as party since the security interest is not
affected by the discharge in Bankruptcy of either spouse
and can be foreclosed by process against either spouse,
as both signed the note.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent has a security interest in the
property pledged, because title in the property always
remained with the Paces and never passed to either the
Bankruptcy Court or the lien holders.

-11-
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proceeding does not discharge the security interest, but
only the debt.

Since a disclaimer was given with respect

to the propPrty, the state court is the appropriate court
to adjudicate the parties interests in the property.

It

is submitted that the Appellant is severally liable for the
debt and that suit against her alone is proper.

Also, her

intervening Bankruptcy likewise did not affect the lien held
by the Respondent.

The Respondent is entitled to satisfy

the lien as outlined per statute.

The provisions of the

Uniform Commercial Code do not conflict or supersede the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act since this issue involves
only disclaimed property and the foreclosure of a lien which
was in existence

~rior

to any Bankruptcy proceedings.

A

tenuous assertion of an estate by the entireties should not
be effective to defeat the rights of the secured party as to
the property and thus Replevin by the secured party is
appropriate.

Respectively submitted,

-12-
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CEPTIFICATE OF MAILING

---~---~------

A copy of the forgoing Brief of Respondent
was posted in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to the Attorney of Appellant, Pete N. Vlahos,
Esq., Le<]al Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden,
Utah 84401, on this the ~C:-ctay of March, 1977.

(l1(flu

Secretary

/Ir< al Mo,'---

-13-
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EXHIBIT A:

Order to \·J a iv e Undertaking

EXHIBIT B:

Writ of Replevin

EXHIBIT

c:

EXHIBIT D:

Precipe
Order Staying Proceedings
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lIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN
BROWNING AND BLACKBURN
Attorney for Plaintiff
S21 Eccles Building
OgJen, UT
84401
Jelephone: 393-8463
IN

THE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
W.E.A. CREDIT UN ION,

+

Plaintiff,

+

ORDER TO WAIVE UNDERTAKING
vs.

+

PAULA PACE,

+

Defendant.

+

This matter came on regularly

Civil No. 63776
for hearing on

plaintiff's motion to waive undertaking on the 21st day of April,
1976 before the honorable Calvin Gould, one of the Judges of said
Court, Timothy W. Blackburn appearing on behalf of the plaintiff
and David Knowlton appearing on behalf of the defendant and the
Court having heard the arguments of the respective counsel and
being fully awrised in the premises makes the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the bond requirement of
Rule 64B he waived in the above matter.
Dated this

~day

of April, 1976.

c

EXHIBIT A
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•
TIMOTHY W. BLACKBURN
BROWNING 'ND BLACKBURN
Attornev for Plaintiff
521 Eccles Bldg.
Ogden, lJT 84401
Telephone: 393-8463
IN THE DISTRICT COURl

Oi'

fHE SErO'l!I

or

T:I/ /\~D H1H TllE COUNTY

W.E.A.

CREDIT UNION,

llJlllCl.\L !llSIRICI

I\ l.Bl.R. 'OT \l l

Ill lll \II

J

Plaintiff,

T
\\ R l I 0 I·

vs.
PAUEA PACE,

1'1. PI I \ I \

I

De fcn,l3n t.

T
l

THE STATE OF UTAH:

1.Ue\::..,.c-

To the Sheri ff of ~County, lit ah, Crcet in gs:
WHEREAS,

I

an Order pursu3nt to Order to Show rausc w~s

in the ahove case,

cntcrc~

in the District Court of Weber Countv, llL•h,

holding that the plaintiff was entitled to take possession of ccr·
tain personal prorertv hereinafter dC"scribcd, and th:1t
~·as

to take po,;,cssion of said propcrt1· :ind turn

the Shen ff

it ,n·cr to the

plaintiff for disposition under the terms of the Uniform Com111crc1<1
Code.
NOW, THEREFORE, we command vou,
up said property, to-wit:

sofa,

RCA 19" Color TV, Sears 17'
Maytag Washer, 9'
trill,

Sofa,

bedroom set,

the said Sheri ff,

Z ch:iirs, I end table,:'. lamps,

Deep free:c,

ch.Ji rs,

to pick

Coldsrot

Refrigerator,

2 l3mps, .Jcnnai r counter top

2 ten speed bikes,

and turn said prorcrtv

over the the rlaintiff for disrosition under the terms of the
Uniform Commercial
WITNESS,

Code as set

the Hon

forth

in ,;aid (lrJcr.

JOHN F. WAHLQUIST

District Court of \l'eher County, !Jtah, this

.Judge of the
__ _L_ day of Apr1!,J~~h.

Given under my hand and the 'cal of sa1J Court

tills -~--

day of l\pril, 1976.
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D•"" T. Baow•••• 11

TIMOTHY W. llLACK8UflN

ATl'Oltft<l•T• AT LAW

EXHIBIT B

TIMOTHY W. BLACKBJRN
BROWNING AND BLACKBURN
Attorney for Plaintiff
521 Eccles Building
Ogden, UT
84401
Telephone: 393-8463
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH

W.E.A

CREDIT UNION,

+

Plaintiff,

+

vs.

+

PAULA P.ACE,

+

Defendant.

PRECIPE

File No. 63776

+

TO THE ?HERIFF OF WEBER COUNTY, UTAH:

Lllti\.

o'- Q.cpl<ll1N
on the

E~eeaeien

You will serve the attached

Defendant and attach the personal property listed thereon and
turn the same over to the Plaintiff for sale under the provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Said property is located at 5780 Village Way in
Ogden, Utah.
If you need assistance for identification or transportation of said property, please contact the plaintiff's agent
Mr. Bremser at 399-5941, ext. 373, to make said arrangements.
'

~

Dated this _j__ day of {-'...0 ' ; (

' 1976.

j

WENDELL HANSEN, Cl F~':

CLERK

c Ct.
Deputy Clerk

I
By?/

-

I \, i \ (

EXHIBIT C
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF UTAH, NORTHERN DIVISION

IN RE

I

PAULA PACE,

I

Bankruptcy No. B-76-

I

Bankrupt.

ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS
Upon the Motion of Paula Pace, the Bankrupt above named,
praying that in accordance with Rule 60l(a) of the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, an Order be issued staying any act for the
commencement or continuation of any Court proceeding to enforce
a lien against property in the custody of the Bankruptcy Court,
and it appearing that the Petitioner in Bankruptcy, Paula Pace,
has filed a Petition in Bankruptcy and that the property in
possession of the Bankrupt is now in the custody of this Court,

it is
ORDERED, that all proceedings be stayed as against the
Bankrupt-Petitioner and that notice be served upon W.E.A. Credit
Union and upon the Sheriff of Weber County, that the enforcement
of any lien as against the Petitioner herein is stayed until
final adjudication by this Court.
DATED at Salt Lake

Ci~,, u~
'

t

dd. day

this ••

I·,/
I

BANKRUPTCY

EXHIBIT D

-~
1

\

/

~6JUDGE
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of May, 1976.
fl
I

,

•
_.....,._~

